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COMMON PROBLEMS AFFECTING SUPRANATIONAL ATTEMPTS IN AFRICA: 
AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW 
 
B Fagbayibo
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Ever  since  the  colonial  era,  attempts  have  been  made,  throughout  the  various 
regions of Africa, at building supranational units chiefly for both administrative and 
legal convenience. Examples of such attempts include the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland,  the East African High Commission and the Federations in former 
French  West  and  Equatorial  Africa,  all  of  which  were  attempts  at  forging  a 
supranational nation state.  
 
These "federations" could not withstand the intricate dynamics of the independence 
tsunami,  mainly  because  the  post-independence  political  elite  consolidated 
colonially-defined national territorial integrity and sovereignty. Instead, efforts were 
geared  towards  establishing  supranational  organisations  at  sub-regional  levels  to 
cater for functional economic needs. At the continental level, the OAU Charter was 
far from establishing a continental supranational organisation. Rather, emblems of 
supranationalism  remain  prominent  at  the  sub-regional  levels:  the  East  African 
Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 
the Organisation for Harmonisation in Africa of Business Laws (OHADA). 
 
It is against this background that this article aims at investigating selected attempts 
at  supranationalism  on  the  continent,  the  successes  and  failures  of  such 
experiments,  and  the  lessons  to  be  learnt  from  them.  As  Africa  embarks  on  the 
journey  of  solidifying its  unity  through  the establishment  of  leviathan  continental 
institutions, efforts should be geared towards building on the experiences of past 
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and  present  experiments  at  the  sub-regional  level.  Such  experiments  offer 
instructive lessons as they are rooted in similar historical and social contexts. 
 
Thus, this article begins with an analysis of supranationalism. This is followed by an 
outline  of  attempts  at  supranationalism  within  Africa.  It  concludes  by  discussing 
some  of  the  common  challenges,  as  evident  in  the  foregoing  analysis,  facing 
(supranational) integration in Africa. 
 
2  The supranational focus 
 
Supranationalism is a politico-legal concept which embodies but is not limited to the 
following core elements: decisional autonomy (in particular the rule of the voting 
majority as opposed to consensus), the binding effect of the laws of international 
organisations  (where  member  states  are  precluded  from  enacting  contradictory 
laws), the institutional autonomy of an organisation from its member states, and the 
direct binding effect of laws emanating from regional organisations on natural and 
legal persons in member states.
1 Essentially, supranationalism implies the existence 
of  an  organisation  capable  of  exercising  authoritative  powers  over  its  member 
states.  This  is  the  point  where  supranational  organisations  are  different  from 
intergovernmental institutions, since the latter  are  merely forums  for inter-state 
cooperation. In this respect, the legal personality of an institution will determine 
whether or not it is a supranational institution. 
 
Legal personality is the concept which defines "the actual attribution of rights and/or 
duties (of international organisations) on the international plane ".
2 Such attributes 
are expressly or tacitly stipulated in the constituen t treaty.
3 The constituent treaty 
will for example indicate the procedural capacity of an international organisation to 
make treaties, enforce its decisions and enter into agreements with other entities.
4 
Similarly, such powers could be inferred from the p owers and objectives of the 
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particular organisation. It is important to note that the extent of the functions of a 
particular organisation determines the level of its legal personality. For example, an 
organisation such as the European Union (EU) has a more extensive legal personality 
than the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU). This is because the EU, 
unlike the latter, has moved from the minimal threshold of inter-state cooperation to 
the  creation  of  institutions  parallel  to  and/or  superseding  the  jurisdiction  of  its 
member states in relation to agreed matters of common interest.
5 
 
It must, however, be emphasised that the discourse on supranationalism should not 
begin from an  "all-or-nothing" perspective. Any enquiry into the presence or lack 
thereof  of  supranational  elements  should  not  only  be  directed  at  identifying 
overarching supranational features but in addition should engage in highlighting the 
hybridity or juxtaposition of elements  – intergovernmental and supranational. The 
reality  is  that  even  when  an  organisation  possesses  all  of  the  elements  of 
supranationalism, there are still some embedded features of intergovernmentalism. 
The EU, for example, is designated as a supranational organisation, but one of its 
primary decision-making organs, the Council of European Union, consists of national 
ministers who primarily champion the agenda of their governments.
6 The Council 
remains the apical decision-making body on matters relating to foreign policy, justice 
and  home  affairs.
7  Also  the  UN,  an  a rchetypal  intergovernmental  organisation, 
exercises supranational powers especially in relation to voting rules in the General 
Assembly and sometimes in the Security Council.
8  
                                                           
5   The EU exercises both exclusive and shared competence in a number of areas. It has exclusive 
competence over matters such as its customs union, economic and monetary policy, competition 
laws, the common international trade policy, the common fisheries policy and the conclusion of 
some international agreements. It shares competence with member states on a wide range of 
issues such as food, the environment, social policy, transport, human rights and development 
aid. Available on European Commission official website (EC Date unknown http://bit.ly/YPSEv1).  
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3  Overview of selected supranational attempts in Africa 
 
3.1  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
 
The earliest manifestation of pan-African integration can be traced to West Africa.
9 
Intertwined with the nationalist struggle against colonialism, activists from (British) 
West  Africa,  as  early  as  the  mid -nineteenth  century,  advocated  for  regional 
cooperation through either a federal arrangement or the establishment of common 
institutions such as the Court of Appeal and a university.
10  
 
Decolonisation in the early 1960s further intensified efforts at integration mainly by  
the political elite, a marked shift from the previous advocacy by non -state actors.
11 
Concrete attempts to transform the "idea" of West Africa into an institutional form 
started  in  1972  when  the  leaders  of  Nigeria  and  Togo,  Generals  Gowon  and 
Eyadema respectively, signed a bilateral Treaty  designed as a launch-pad for wider 
sub-regional cooperation.
12 On 28 May 1975 fifteen West African states converged in 
Lagos to sign the  treaty establishing ECOWAS.
13 The economic focus of the 1975 
treaty can be gleaned from some of its objectives, which include the elimination of 
customs  duties,  the  free  movement  of  persons,  capital,  and  services,  and  the 
harmonisation of agricultural and industrial policies.
14 
 
The stark reality of a fast-changing global political and economic order,
15 especially 
the  realisation  that  the  1975  Treaty  proved  inadequate  at  deepening  regional 
                                                           
9   Thompson Africa and Unity 28. See also Kufuor Institutional Transformation 19-21 and Asante 
Political Economy of Regionalism 45-47. 
10   Thompson  Africa  and  Unity  28;  Kufuor  Institutional  Transformation  19-20;  Asante  Political 
Economy of Regionalism 45-47. 
11   Kufuor Institutional Transformation 20-21. 
12   Asante Political Economy of Regionalism 55. 
13   These states include Benin, Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
Cape  Verde  acceded  to  the  ECOWAS  Treaty  in  1977.  In  1999/2000  Mauritania  withdrew  its 
membership from ECOWAS. 
14   Article 2 ECOWAS Treaty (1975). 
15   Kufuor identifies the following as some of the factors that necessitated the move towards 
supranationalism  in  ECOWAS:  the  need  for  institutional  efficiency ;  the  search  for  political 
legitimacy by ECOWAS leaders; ideological change within West Africa ; the desire for stronger 
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integration,  led  to  the  establishment  in  May  1990  of  a  Committee  of  Eminent 
Persons to review the 1975 Treaty.
16 One recommendation of the Committee was 
that  more  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  supranationalism  within  ECOWAS, 
especially the vesting of more powers on the organs of the community.
17  The 
Committee’s report formed the basis of the 1993 revised Treaty of ECOWAS.  
 
To underscore its mission of institutional transformation, the Authority in June 2006 
approved  the  transformation  of  the  Executive  Secretariat  into  a  nine-member 
Commission with a President, a Vice-President and seven Commissioners.
18  
 
Having  experienced  some  of  Africa’s  worst  armed  conflicts,  ECOWAS  found  it 
important to put in place a supranational security mechanism.
19 In this regard the 
security architecture of ECOWAS has been adjudged as one of the best on the 
continent.
20 ECOWAS has successfully intervened in hot-spots such as Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea Bissau.
21 Learning from the past mistakes of its interventions 
across the sub-region, ECOWAS has established an overarching, all-inclusive security 
mechanism which consists of  a  Mediation and Security Council,  a  Defence and 
Security Commission, and a Council of Elders.
22 The Mediation and Security Council 
is made up of ten members, and decisions are made by a two -thirds majority of six 
members.
23 In addition, civil society is encouraged to contribute to the organisation’s 
early warning system mechanism.
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
See Kufuor Institutional Transformation 40-46. 
16   Kufuor Institutional Transformation 132-170. 
17   Kufuor Institutional Transformation 146. 
18   See the ECOWAS Newsletter 2006. Available on the ECOWAS official website (ECOWAS Date 
unknown http://bit.ly/YtEMgE). 
19   According to Adebajo, the three civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau claimed  
over 250,000 lives and generated over 1.2 million refugees. See Adebajo 2005  Internationale 
Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
20   Cilliers 2008 Institute of Security Studies Papers 13-14. 
21   Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
22   Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
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3.2  Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)  
 
The  SACU
25  was  established  in  1910,  thus  making  it  the  world’s  oldest  Customs 
Union.
26 Its origins date back to the 1889  Customs Union Convention entered into 
between the British Colony of  the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State 
Boer republic.
27 The 1910 agreement extended membership of the organisation to 
the  British  High  Commission  Territories  (HCT)  of  Basutoland  (now  Lesotho), 
Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland. Namibia (then South  West Africa) 
was a  de facto  member because it was then administered by South Africa.
28 The 
underlying idea behind this arrangement was to incorporate the HCTs into South 
Africa.
29  
 
The 1910 agreement tasked the SACU with supranational duties by providing for the 
free movement of manufactured products, a common external tariff on all goods 
imported into the Union ,  and a revenue -sharing formula for the distribution of 
customs and excise.
30 Under this agreement South Africa was to receive 98.7% of 
the joint revenue, Bechuanaland 0.27%, Basutoland 0.88% and Swaziland 0.15%.
31 
Another feature of  the SACU is the 1974  Rand Monetary Agreement (RMA), which 
made the rand the only legal tender within SACU.
32 However, Botswana pulled out of 
the  arrangement  in  1975.  To  addre ss  the  concerns  of  other  member  states, 
especially in relation to independent monetary control, the agreement was amended 
in 1986 by giving more autonomy to Lesotho and Swaziland.
33 
 
                                                           
25   It consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. Except for South Africa 
the member states are commonly referred to as the BLNS states. 
26   SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
27   SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
28   SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
29   The electoral victory of the National Party in So uth Africa in 1948 signalled the impossibility of 
such a move. See Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
30   Gibb 1997 JSAS 75. 
31   Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
32   AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 185. 
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Growing concerns about certain policies emanating from South Africa, which largely 
resulted in trade diversion
34 and subsequently had a negative impact on the GDP of 
other member states, led to the replacement of the 1910 agreement by the 1969 
agreement.
35  The  1969  agreement  attempted  to  address  the  major  source  of 
contention,  namely  the  revenue-sharing  formula,
36  by  making  provision  for  the 
inclusion of excise duties in the common revenue pool.
37 This revenue pool is divided 
among  the  member  states  according  to  the  annual  imports,  production  and 
consumption of dutiable goods.
38 Based on this arrangement, the revenue share of 
member states, except for South Africa, is further enhanced by an annual 42% 
compensation allowance.
39 
 
These measures did little to change the status quo, mainly because South Africa still 
retained the sole decision-making power over policies affecting the customs union 
arrangement.
40  South  Africa’s  transition  to  democratic  governance  and  the 
independence  of  Namibia  set  the  tone  for  a  renewed  engagement  on  SACU 
policies.
41 These negotiations gave birth to the 2002  SACU Agreement. To highlight 
the importance of joint decision-making, the new agreement created an independent 
administrative body (the Secretariat) to oversee  the  SACU.
42  Other independent 
institutions include the SACU Council of Ministers, the Commission,  the  National 
Bodies, the Tariff Board, the Technical Liaison Committees and a Tribunal.
43 On the 
contentious issue of revenue sharing, the new agreement provided for a revised 
formula which consists of customs, excise and development components.
44  
                                                           
34   According to Gibb, trade diversion "occurs when a customs union adopts a protectionist external 
trade  regime  forcing  member  states  to  displace  imports  of  efficiently  produced  goods  from 
countries outside the trading arrangement with more expensive imports from partner countries". 
See Gibb 1997 JSAS 78.  
35   Gibb 1997 JSAS 75. 
36   The revenue derived from the SACU’s common external tariff represents a significant source of 
economic development in the BLNS countries. According to Ngwenya, it makes up approximately 
50% of Swaziland’s and Lesotho’s budget revenues, and 30% and 17% of the budget revenues 
of Namibia and Botswana. See Ngwenya 2002 Sisebenze Sonke 26. 
37   Gibb 1997 JSAS 77. See also SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
38   Gibb 1997 JSAS 77. 
39   Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
40   SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
41   Alden and Soko 2005 JMAS 370-371. 
42   Article 3 SACU Agreement (2002).  
43   Article 7 SACU Agreement (2002). 
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Compared  to  other  sub-regional  entities,  the  SACU  can  claim  far-reaching  and 
substantial  achievements  such  as  the  harmonisation  of  policies  on  competition, 
investment and intellectual property rights.
45 In addition, the organisation also has a 
relatively successful  framework for engaging with external parties such as the EU 
and the United States of America.
46 
 
3.3  The East African Community 
 
East African integration dates back to the attempt by the British colonial authority to 
build an economic bloc and at the same time secure greater political control over the 
region.
47  Prior  to  the  1926  Governors’  Conference,  which  laid  a  groundwork  for 
future areas of cooperation, the region witnessed the establishment of supranational 
institutions such as the Kenya-Uganda Railway,
48 the Court of Appeal for East Africa 
(1902), a common currency (1905), a Postal Union (1917) and a  Customs Union 
(1917).
49  
 
After a series of recommendations and reports highlighting the feasibility of closer 
integration in the region,
50 the East Africa High Commission (EAHC)
51 was officially 
established in 1948. The headquarters of the EAHC were situated in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The Commission comprised the Governors of Kenya, Tanga nyika (later Tanzania) 
and Uganda, the administrator, a Commissioner for Transport, a Postmaster General 
and a Legal Secretary. The Legislative Assembly, with the consent of the High 
Commission, had the power to enact laws for the three territories.
52 The activities of 
                                                           
45   Alves, Draper and Halleson 2007 http://bit.ly/YB4KZQ. 
46   Alves, Draper and Halleson 2007 http://bit.ly/YB4KZQ 18. 
47   Ojeinda 2005 E Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 221-222. 
48   The construction of this railway in 1894 is commonly regarded as the start of the integration 
process in the region. See Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 214. 
49   Ojeinda 2005 E Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 222. 
50   Delupis East African Community 19-26. 
51   Delupis observes that the EAHC was not an international organisation  strictu sensu because its 
members were colonial entities. See Delupis East African Community 31. 
52   Some  of  the  important  Acts  enacted  by  the  Assembly  include  the  Railways  and  Harbours 
Administration Act, the  Customs Management Act, the  Income Tax Management Act and Acts 
setting  up  institutions  of  higher  learning  in  East  Africa.  See   Banfield  "Structure  and 
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the  High  Commission  covered  a  whole  range  of  fields  such  as  aviation, 
telecommunications, income tax, customs and excise, science and research, defence 
and education.  
 
Being  a  colonial  construct  the  EAHC’s  legitimacy  was  largely  questioned  by  the 
majority of East Africans. They, in particular the leading political elites in the three 
territories of the region, questioned the composition of the commission, the loyalty 
of its members and its detachment from the realities on the ground.
53 The sharp 
disapproval of the EAHC was also fuelled by the quest for independence in the three 
territories. Political elites viewed the Commission as a vestige of the British Empire 
and  were  determined  to  wrest  the  control  both  of  their  territories  and  the 
organisation from the colonists. 
 
The continued opposition to the functioning of the EAHC led to discussions between 
the East African leadership and their British counterparts. An agreement was finally 
reached and the EAHC was replaced in December 1961 by a new institution called 
the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO). 
 
The EASCO differed from its predecessor in a number of ways. Apart from the fact 
that it was established by an agreement among the three East African governments, 
the constitution also provided that the executive  would be responsible to the three 
East African governments.
54 Unlike its predecessor, the EASCO reflected an African 
outlook by ensuring that East Africans were placed in leadership positions. The 
Central  Legislative  Assembly ,  for  example,  had  more  East  Africans  among  its 
membership.
55  
 
The EASCO served as a  platform for enhancing cooperation among the territories. 
The political elites of the territories viewed the independence of their respective 
territories as the first step, followed by the creation of a Federal East African state. 
In 1963, the political le aders of the East African states  - Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), 
                                                           
53   Banfield "Structure and Administration" 34. 
54   Banfield "Structure and Administration" 32. 
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Julius Nyerere (Tangayika)
56 and Milton Obote (Uganda)  - signed a declaration of 
federation.
57  The declaration, amongst other provisions, aimed at establishing a 
Federation of East Africa.
58  
 
Pursuant  to  endowing  the  organisation  with  more  powers  and  based  on  the 
recommendations of the Phillip Commission, the East African Community Treaty was 
signed in Kampala, Uganda on 6 June 1967 and was inaugurated in Arusha on 1 
December, 1967. The East African Co mmunity (EAC) incorporated the EASCO. In 
terms of the institutional machinery, there was a major change in terms of the 
appointment of the members of the Legislative Assembly. Unlike the EASCO, where 
members  of  the Legislative  Assembly  were  elected  through   a system  of  direct 
election by state legislatures, member states were now given the authority to select 
members of the Assembly.
59 This act stifled the performance of the Assembly since 
the new members’ loyalties lay with the national powers and thus prevented them 
from being critical of the national authorities.
60 The Common Market Tribunal, the 
Court of Appeal for East Africa and the East African Industrial Court jointly held the 
judicial powers.
61 
 
The EAC inherited the organisational structure of the EASC O. It functioned through 
its organs:
62 the East African Authority; the East African Legislative Assembly; the 
East African Ministers; the Tribunals and the East African Development Bank. The 
EAC  also  operated  the  following  Common  Services:  the  East  African  Highway 
Cooperation (EAAC), the East African Posts and Telecommunications Cooperation 
                                                           
56   In 1964 Tangayika and Zanzibar united to form Tanzania. 
57   See  "The  Federation  Declaration"  of  5  June  1963.   The  Declaration  was  issued  by  the 
governmens of East Africa in Nairobi on 5 June 1963. 
58   As a result of Uganda’s stiff resistance to surrendering sovereignty in respect of citizenship and 
foreign affairs, the idea of a political union was deemed no longer feasible. A major consequence 
of this was the 1965 decision to dismantle the East African Currency Board, thus introducing 
separate currencies in the three member states. See Delupis East African Community 49-50, 53. 
59   Springer "Community Chronology" 22. 
60   Springer "Community Chronology" 22. 
61   The Tribunal had the power to hear cases relating to the alleged violations of the Common 
Market and also to give advisory o pinion to the Common Market Council. The Industrial Court 
could rule only on disputes of an industrial nature while the jurisdictional competence of the 
Court of Appeal was determined by the national laws (Springer "Community Chronology" 23). 
62   Article 3 Treaty for East African Cooperation (1967). B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
42 / 536 
 
(EAP&TC),  the  East  African  Railways  Cooperation  (EARC)  and  the  East  African 
Harbours Cooperation (EAHC).  
 
Alongside  the  European  Community  it  was  widely  acclaimed  as  one  of  the  best 
experiments  in  regional  cooperation.  One  would  have  expected  that  the  shared 
values of the member states should be sufficient to hold the organisation together. 
As  Mazzeo  rightly  pointed  out,  a  multiplicity  of  factors  (political  and  economic) 
contributed  directly  and  indirectly  to  the  dissolution  of  the  community.
63  The 
disbanding of the East African Currency Board, a year after the signing of the EAC, 
was seen as the first ominous development in the long road towards the eventual 
dissolution of the community.
64 This particular act ensured that the member states 
effectively removed the idea of a monetary union from the radar screen of the 
community.
65  
 
The revival of the EAC, after its demise in 1977, had its origin in article 14.02 of the 
Mediation  Agreement  of  1984.  In  terms  of  this  agreement,  three  heads  of  state 
(Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) agreed to "explore areas of future co-operation and 
to make concrete arrangement for such co-operation".
66 The preparatory work for 
the re-establishment of the EAC began in 1993 when the three heads of state signed 
the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for 
East African Co-operation. The Treaty establishing the East African Community was 
signed in Arusha on 30 November 1999.   The Treaty entered into force in 2000. 
Article  9  of  the  EAC  Treaty  outlines  the  following  as  the  institutions  of  the 
community:  the Summit, the Council, the East African Court of Justice, the East 
African  Legislative  Assembly,  the  Secretariat,  the  Sectora l  Committees  and  the 
Coordination  Committees.
67  In  a  milestone  development,  Burundi  and  Rwanda 
became members of the EAC on 1 July 2007. 
 
                                                           
63   Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 151. 
64   Mugomba 1978 JMAS 264. See also Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 215. 
65   Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 215. 
66   EAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/X13X8f. 
67   See the EAC Treaty (1999).  B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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In order to avoid the pitfalls of the past the preamble of the Treaty identified the 
following as the reasons for the dissolution of the old EAC:
68 a lack of strong political 
will; a lack of private sector and civil society participation; disproportionate sharing 
of benefits among partner states ;  and the inability to address th ese issues. The 
objectives of the EAC are, amongst others:
69 
  
  to establish a Customs Union (launched in 2005); 
  to establish a Common Market (launched in 2010); 
  to establish a Monetary Union (expected to be launched before the end of 
2012, it is not yet in operation); and ultimately  
  to establish a Political Federation. 
 
In order to avert the mistakes of the past vis-à-vis the benefits being skewed in 
favour of Kenya, the Customs Union Protocol provides for the duty-free movement 
of all exports from Tanzania and Uganda into Kenya.
70 Goods from Kenya  moving 
into Uganda and Tanzania are classified into two categories: Category A qualifies for 
immediate duty-free treatment while the goods in Category B would be subjected to 
gradual tariff reduction over a period of 5 years.
71 
 
3.4  Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique des Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA) 
 
The OHADA (in English, the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in 
Africa) remains one of the boldest attempts at supranationalism on the continent. 
The character of the OHADA Treaty, which was adopted on 17 October 1993, is 
essentially  pro-development  and  business  inclined.
72  Built  around  the  existing 
economic and political relations among francophone African countries,
73 the Treaty 
                                                           
68   EAC Treaty (1999). 
69   Article 5 EAC Treaty (1999). 
70   Article 11 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (2009). 
71   Article 11(3) Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (2009). 
72   See generally, Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 17-73. 
73   Each of the OHADA member states belongs to the two major French -based economic and 
monetary zones: West Africa  – Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and 
Central Africa - Communaute Economique et Monetaire l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC).  B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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aims to accelerate economic development and foreign investments in member states 
through  the  provision  of  a  secure  judicial  environment.  The  Treaty  regulates  - 
through the Uniform Acts - the following areas: company law, general commercial 
law, securities, enforcement measures, insolvency law, arbitration, accounting law 
and transport.
74 At present there are sixteen member states spread across west and 
central Africa.
75 Since the majority of the member states are francophone countries, 
the OHADA laws are largely based on the French legal system.
76 In pursuant of the 
goal of continental integration, the Treaty provides that membership is open to all 
member states of the AU.
77  
 
An  important  supranational  component  of  the  Treaty  is  the  provision  which 
stipulates that the Uniform Acts are immediately applicable in the domestic laws of 
each member state.
78 Unless specified otherwise (in the Uniform Act), the Treaty 
provides that Uniform Acts shall enter into force 90 days after their adoption.
79 In 
addition, the Uniform Acts shall have direct effect, allowing any party to rely on it s 
provisions 30 days after their publication in the OHADA official journal.
80  
 
The OHADA Common  Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA)   is  one  of  OHADA’s 
strongest supranational institutions.
81 The CCJA has two functions vis -à-vis OHADA 
laws: an arbitration centre and a Supreme Court for judgments delivered by national 
Courts of Appeal. However, the role of the court as an arbitration centre remains 
                                                           
74   OHADA Date unknown http://bit.ly/108BPfz. 
75   They include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon. Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
Most  of  the  OHADA  members  are  francophone  countries  with  a  few  exceptions:  Equatorial 
Guinea (Spanish), Guinea -Bissau (Portuguese) and the English speaking parts of Cameroon.  
76   The laws of Guinea Bissau (which was colonised by Portugal) and Equatorial Guinea (colonised 
by Spain) are similar to those of the French legal system. This was due to the influence of the 
French Commercial Code on the Spanish and Portuguese laws. These laws belong to the civil law 
tradition. See La Porta et al 1998 Journal of Political Economy 1118.  
77   General Clause Title 1, Article 53  OHADA Treaty (1993). The following countries have signified 
their intentions to join the organisation  – the Democratic Republic of Congo (which is in the 
process  of  becoming  a  member),  Ghana,  Nigeria  and  Liberia.  See  Carton  and  Cousin  2007 
http://bit.ly/16dnpA9.  
78   Article 10 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
79   Article 9 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
80   Article 9 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
81   The other is the Council of Ministers, which is the legislative arm of OHADA. It is responsible for 
the adoption of Uniform Acts. See Article 3 OHADA Treaty (1993). B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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undeveloped.
82 As the Court of last resort in terms of the OHADA laws, the CCJA 
plays a primary role in ensuring that there is uniform application of the OHADA laws 
in member states.
83  In respect of interpretation of the treaty, both the member 
states and the Council of Ministers may approach the Court in this regard.
84 Appeal 
to the Court can be instituted  either by one of the parties to the proceedings or by 
referral of a national court.
85 In relation to the enforcement of the Court’s decisions, 
the Treaty entrusts the member states with this function.
86  
 
3.5  The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) 
 
WAEMU is one of two CFA franc zones in Africa, the other being the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Built around a common, convertible 
currency  -  the  CFA  franc  -  and  a  shared  colonial  heritage,
87  the  WAEMU  was 
established in 1994 as a measure to address the attendant effects of the devaluation 
of  the  CFA  franc  and  in  turn,  to  strengthen  the  economic  cooperation  among 
member states.
88 The objectives of the organisation include the harmonisation of 
laws,  the  creation  of  a  common  market ,  and  the  convergence  of  the  macro-
economic policies of member states.
89  
 
The supranational ambition of the organisation is affirmed in article 6 of the UEMOA 
Treaty.
90  Lavergne  notes  that  the  supranational  nature  of  the  UEMOA  can  be 
inferred from four functions highlighted in the treaty:
91 
 
                                                           
82   Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 56. 
83   See Articles 13-18 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
84   See Article 14  OHADA Treaty (1993). On a number of occasions the CCJA has ruled that the 
OHADA laws are superior to any conflicting national laws. See Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l 
L 56. 
85   Article 15 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
86   Article 20 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
87   The original seven members - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo - 
are francophone countries. Guinea-Bissau, a Portuguese-speaking country, later joined the group 
in 1997. 
88   Masson and Pattillo Monetary Union in West Africa 8-9. See also Alexander, Oleynik and Oliynik 
WAEMU Business Law Handbook 6-7. 
89   Article 4 UEMOA Treaty (1994). 
90   Article 6 states that the UEMOA’s statutes are superior to the laws of member states. 
91   Lavergne "Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa" 18-21. B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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  Supranationality over monetary matters 
  The  prohibition  of  the  application  of  new  protectionist  measures  against 
member states (Article 77) 
  The  obligatory  nature  of  institutional  directives,  regulations  and  decisions 
(Article 43) 
  The existence of surveillance mechanisms and sanctions (Articles 64, 65, 72-
75) 
 
The  institutional  architecture  of  the  organisation  comprises  of  the  Conference  of 
Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, the Commission and 
the  Central  Bank  of  the  States  of  West  Africa  (BCEAO).
92  The  BCEAO  is  the 
institution that truly reflects the supranational status of the organisation.
93 It is the 
institution  solely  responsible  for  the  issuing  of  currency  on  the  territory  of  its 
member states and also  for monetary policy within the zone.
94 In this regard the 
BCEAO  has  been  commended  for  pursuing  prudent  monetary  policy  amidst 
worsening economic performance in some member states.
95  
 
Among the achievements of the WAEMU since its inception are the  convergence of 
macro-economic  criteria,  the  harmonisation  of  business  laws  (especially  indirect 
taxation regulations),  and the  establishment of  a  customs union and  a  common 
external tariff. 
96 
 
3.6  The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
 
As previously stated, the CEMAC
97 is the second CFA Franc zone in Africa.  In 1994 
the CEMAC replaced the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), an 
organisation that  had been established in 1961 to promote monetary cooperation 
                                                           
92   WAEMU Date unknown http://bit.ly/X50p55. 
93   See eg Busch 2009 http://bit.ly/WPcxpp. 
94   Busch 2009 http://bit.ly/WPcxpp. See also Alexander, Oleynik and Oliynik WAEMU Business Law 
Handbook 6-7. 
95   See IMF 2001, http://bit.ly/WRp0J0. 
96   AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 30. 
97   Of the six members of the organisation, five - Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon and Chad 
- are former French colonies. The sixth member, Equatorial Guinea, is a former Spanish colony.  B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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among francophone central African nations.
98 The CEMAC, like the WAEMU, aims to 
create a common market, harmonise laws and sectoral policies, and  promote the 
convergence of the macro-economic policies of member states.
99 The organisation is 
made up of the following insti tutions: the Conference of the Heads of States,  the 
Council of Ministers, the Community Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Bank 
of Central African States (BEAC).
100  
 
As with the WAEMU, the BEAC is the supranational institution responsible for issuing 
the CFA Franc within the zone and in addition control s the monetary policy of the 
zone.
101 At present the CEMAC has in place financial and legal (harmonisation of 
business laws) regulatory mechanisms.
102  
 
However, the customs union is yet to function effecti vely largely as a result of the 
low level of intra -community trade, bureaucratic bottlenecks that hinder the free 
flow of goods and services, and the lack of political will to fast-track integration.
103 
 
4  Common  factors  hindering  the  maximal  realisation  of 
supranationalism in Africa 
 
As is evident in the preceding discussion, experimentation with supranationalism is 
not  novel  in  Africa.  Some  of  the  organisations  discussed  above  have  made 
considerable progress on certain fronts, especially on monetary, security, business 
and judicial matters. Setting the tone for continental integration, these institutions 
have made often modest but sometimes bold incursions into issues bordering on 
state  sovereignty.  Although  mainly  working  within  the  rigid  context  of  the  over-
bearing influence of member states, organisations like the CEMAC and the WAEMU 
have  put  in  place  structures  for  monitoring  and  ensuring  compliance  with  the 
monetary policies of member states. The OHADA framework ensures, through its 
                                                           
98   CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version).  
99   CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version). 
100   CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version). 
101   CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version) 
102   AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 29. 
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institutions,  the  supranationality  of  its  jurisdiction  on  matters  relating  to  the 
harmonised business laws. In a series of interviews conducted by Dickerson with 
various stakeholders across OHADA member states, optimistic views were expressed 
about  the  success  of  the  process,  especially  in  relation  to  the  execution  of 
judgments.
104 In the SACU, the revenue derived from the Common External Tariff 
(CET)  amounts  to  a  significant  portion  of  the  budget  revenue  of  its  member 
states.
105 All of these facts point to the beneficial nature of supranationalism and its 
potential in addressing some of the continent’s problems.  
 
In spite of the achievements outlined above, there is still room for improvement. As 
will  be  shown  below,  the  worrying  question  relates  to  the  glaring  disconnect 
between  commitment  to  supranationalism  at  public  fora  and  the  creation  of  an 
enabling environment for it to be operational. Put simply, there has been a gross 
lack of political will on the part of Africa states to translate goals and objectives into 
reality.
106  
 
Thus, this section will attempt to tease out some of the obstacles to integration in 
Africa, especially within the context of supranationalism. In essence, the discussion 
will  primarily  focus  on  the  factors  responsible  for  the  inability  of  regional 
organisations in Africa to exercise supranational powers. 
 
4.1  Weak institutional machinery 
 
A major impediment to operationalising supranationalism in Africa is the fact that 
regional institutions are not independent enough to implement integration initiatives. 
These institutions are expected to operate in accordance with the whims of member 
states which are often run by dictators with personal interests at heart, rather than 
to fulfil the ambitious objectives of the organisation. It is thus not uncommon to see 
                                                           
104   Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 65. 
105   It makes up approximately 50% of Swaziland’s and Lesotho’s budget revenues, and 30% and 
17% of the budget revenues of Namibia and Botswana. See Ngwenya 2002 Sisebenze Sonke 26. 
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the  dissolution  or  derailment  of  integration  initiatives  based  on  the  change  of 
government in member states, or personal differences among heads of state.
107  
 
The dissolution of the first EAC is a classical case. The 1971 military putsch in 
Uganda quickened the eventual demise of the community. Julius Nyerere, being a 
close friend to the overthrown Milton Obote, disliked Idi Amin, the new Ugandan 
leader.
108 As Garba
109 notes, both Nyerere and Amin threw caution to the wind by 
verbally abusing each other at public forums. The functioning of the community was 
adversely affected by this enmity.
110 This was because the decision-making powers 
resided with the heads of states and government. 
 
There  is  a  strong  nexus  between  the  effective  implementation  of  integration 
initiatives and the autonomy of regional institutions. The ability of these institutions 
to act above member states in respect of specific areas of common interests ensures 
that integration is firmly placed in capable and neutral hands and insulated from the 
vagaries  of  national  politics.  It  also  guarantees  that  integration  proceeds  at  a 
significant  pace  since  decisions  will  not  always  be  taken  unanim ously  or  by 
consensus. In the case of the OHADA, it could be argued that the successful 
implementation of the harmonisation of business law is largely attributable to an 
independent and reliable Court of Justice.
111  The same  could  be said about the 
BCEAO and BEAC as independent institutions within the WAEMU/UEMOA and  the 
CEMAC respectively.  
                                                           
107   In  relation  to  the  New  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development  (NEPAD),  some  analysts  have 
expressed concern about the continued existence of the programme, especially after its  main 
architects,  Olusegun  Obasanjo  and  Thabo  Mbeki,  retired  from  office  as  presidents  of  their 
respective countries. See eg Dowden Africa 534. Since the retirement of both presidents, the 
momentum that heralded the establishment of the programme has largely dissipated.  
108   Nyerere also resented the fact that Idi Amin was seen by white minority regimes in Southern 
Africa as an archetypical embodiment of the failure of black African leadership. See Gregorian 
"Plowshares into Swords" 189. 
109   Garba Diplomatic Soldering 125. 
110   As Mazzeo observed, the East African Authority, the highest decision making organ of the 
community, had no meeting in seven years as a result of this clash. See  Mazzeo "Experience of 
the East African Community" 156. 
111   In a series of interviews conducted by Dickerson with various stakeholders in OHADA member 
states, many expressed their optimism about the success of this initiative and also praised the 
clarity of OHADA laws vis -à-vis the execution  of  judgments.  See  Dickerson 2005  Colum J 
Transnat'l L 65. B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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Another factor that hampers the smooth running of integration initiatives is the lack 
of funds. The epileptic state of the economies of some African states, coupled with 
their obligations to pay annual dues to the various sub-regional organisations they 
belong  to,  largely  contributes  to  their  inability  to  discharge  their  financial 
obligations.
112 There is no gainsaying the point that the availability of funds is crucial 
for the virility of any organisation, most especially an organisation charged with the 
responsibility of furthering a capital-intensive project - regional integration and co-
operation.
113 
 
4.2  Non-implementation of key integration initiatives 
 
As stated earlier, one of the core features of supranationalism is the binding nature 
of the laws emanating from the international institutions. In order for such laws to 
have teeth, it is necessary that they either enjoy equal legal status with domestic 
laws or in some cases supersede them. This is where the doctrinal question of the 
relationship between international and domestic law comes into the picture.  
 
In international law, there are three theories governing such a relationship: monism, 
dualism  and  harmonisation.
114  According  to  monists,  law  is  hierarchical,  with 
international law and domestic/national law being part of the same  legal order.
115 
Therefore, international law applies in the domestic system without any need for its 
incorporation.
116  Dualists view that international law  and  domestic law  are two 
distinct fields of law.
117 Furthermore, in order for international law to be bin ding in 
the  domestic  system,  there  is  a  need  for  some  process  of  incorporation  or 
                                                           
112   The issue of overlapping and multiple memberships will be discussed below. 
113   In CEMAC for example, it has been observed that the lack of funds has made it impossible to  
retain or hire qualified staff (IMF 2005 http://bit.ly/YDkvPV). In their analysis of the problems of 
finance in the African Union (AU), Ncube and Akena highlight that the organisation functions 
each year with only 50-60% of its required finance, and that only 1.9% of the total budget is 
targeted for regional integration programmes (Ncube and Akena 2012 http://bit.ly/14juxwz).  
114   Dugard International Law 43-47. 
115   Dugard International Law 47. 
116   Dugard International Law 43-47. 
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transformation.
118 Lastly, the harmonists seek to arrive at some form of convergence 
by holding that where there is a conflict between the application of international law 
and domestic law, the court should apply the rules operative within its jurisdiction.
119 
The consequence of this is that the court may apply either of the two.
120 
 
Placing these theories within the African context, the issue is not so much the nature 
of the legal framework, be it monist or dualist, but rather the lack of political will to 
domestically implement international law in the form of integration programmes 
such as the elimination of tariffs and  the free movement of persons.
121 In spite of 
the agreement on the free movement of persons and goods within ECOWAS, it has 
been observed that security agents continue to harass and intimidate citizens across 
ECOWAS frontiers.
122 Also, the proposed common currency for the West African sub-
region, the Eco, which was  expected to be launched in December 2009, remains 
unlikely due to the non-implementation of convergence criteria by member states.
123 
The  routine  disregard  or  non -implementation  of  these  policies  decimates  the 
relevance of the institutional machinery.
124  
Also related to the above discussion is the issue of the dichotomised legal tradition 
bequeathed  to  Africa  by  colonisation.  A  principal  effect  of  colonisation  is  the 
adoption of the legal system of the colonists. African countries  therefore  have 
divergent rules and regulations governing specific issues. Citing the example of the 
Mano River Union (MRU), Thompson shows how the income tax regime in Sierra 
Leone, colonised by Britain, frustrates foreign investment , while the tax regime in 
                                                           
118   Umozurike Introduction to International Law 30. 
119   Umozurike Introduction to International Law 31. 
120   Umozurike Introduction to International Law 30. 
121   Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 90. See also Kufuor 1996 Afr J Int’l Comp L 6-7. 
122   Bakare  The Punch  67. In 1983, the Nigerian government, in contravention of the   ECOWAS 
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons , expelled nationals of ECOWAS member states from its 
territory. See Kufuor 1996 Afr J Int’l Comp L 33. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of 
Persons  and  the  right  of  residence  and  establishment  were  enacted  in  1979.  The  Protocol 
guarantees the free entry of citizens from member states without visa for 90 days. The free 
entry aspect of the Protocol was ratified in 1980, and the right of residence aspect was ratified in 
1986. The component on the right to establishment is yet to come into force. 
123   The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is a monetary arrangement among five countries: 
Gambia,  Guinea,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone  and  Ghana.  See  Obayuwana  and  Okwe  2009 
http://bit.ly/108o2FO. 
124   According to the IMF, in spite   of the establishment of a customs union within WAEMU and 
CEMAC, the momentum of integration continues to be slowed down by member states’ non-
compliance with key convergence criteria. See IMF 2005 http://bit.ly/YDkvPV 16. B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
52 / 536 
 
Liberia,  influenced  by  the  United  States  of  America,  is  more  favourable.
125  The 
consequence  of  such  dissimilarities  is  the  uneven  implementation  or  outright 
disregard  of  policies  by  member  states.
126  This  reality  is  more  evident  in  the 
preference  of some African states to integrate around s hared legal system (eg  
OHADA  and  WAEMU).  There  is  no  doubt  that  a  shared  legal  system  makes 
integration easier, especially with regard to the harmonisation of laws.  
 
Yet  it  is  equally  important  that  in  order  to  translate  the  vision  of  continental 
integration  into  practi ce  member  states  should  be  prepared  to  embark  on  the 
reconciliation of laws in various areas. In this regard more efforts should be made to 
identify  the  common  denominators  in  each  of  the  legal  systems  and ,  more 
importantly, to devise laws which suit the peculiarities of Africa.
127 
 
4.3  Crowded integration landscape 
 
The proliferation of regional organisations is an indicator of the failure of African 
states  to  genuinely  commit  to  a  single,  well-thought-out  and  implementable 
programme.
128  The  competing  objectives  and  programmes  of  these  institutions 
ensure  that  member  states  are  unable  to  wholly  adhere  to  the  supranational 
programmes of the various institutions they belong to. This lack of coordination 
provides an avenue for non-commitment to supranational objectives. Although the 
Constitutive Act provides that the AU must  "coordinate and harmonise the policies 
between the existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of 
the  Union",
129  the  AU  is  yet  to  adopt  the  P rotocol  which  will  provide  a  legal 
                                                           
125   Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 96. 
126   Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 94-97. 
127   See eg Fagbayibo 2009 CILSA 321-322. 
128   According to a ECA survey, the following points were identified as the reasons why African 
countries  join  more  than  one  REC:  strategic  and  political  reasons ;  economic  reasons; 
complementarity;  historical reasons;  geographical proximity;  the need for additional external 
resources; political pressure; and cultural vision. See AU and ECA (n 32) 52-54. 
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framework for the relationship between it and the RECs.
130 In order to address this, 
a number of views have emerged on how to rationalise the RECs.
131  
 
As long as the landscape of African integration is defined by the existence of multiple 
RECs with overlapping and replicated membership, integration will remain a mirage. 
Integration cannot be achieved in a situation where the constituent agencies are 
pulling in different directions. To effectively proceed with the rationalisation process, 
a detailed audit of each of the fourteen RECs should be carried out with the purpose 
of  determining  their viability and relevance to the integration process. The audit 
should establish key points such as the proximity of each REC ’s  activity  to  the 
realisation of the steps outlined by the Abuja Treaty, the feasibility of limiting the 
membership of states to one REC, the delineation of duties and objectives among 
the RECs, the synchronisation of their policies, and the consequence(s) of narrowing 
down the number of the RECs to five. 
 
                                                           
130   See the Draft Protocol on the Relationship Between the Regional Economic Communities (REC) 
and the AU EX/CL/158(1X). 
131   The UN Economic Commission also proposed five possible scenarios: a) Managing the status 
quo, b) Rationalisation by merger and absorpti on, which would entail the merging of existing 
RECs in order to come up with 5 RECs in each of Africa’s sub-region, c) Rationalisation around 
rooted communities, which calls for the creation of RECs according to common characteristics 
such as geography, ethnicity and sociology. d) Rationalisation by division of labour, which divides 
cooperative efforts into regional and sub-regional programmes, categorising them according to 
the interests of the countries in the same region and e) Rationalisation through harmonisation 
and coordination, which aims at the harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalisation, and 
macro-economic convergence policies and criteria of the current regional economic blocs. See AU 
and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 115-126. The AU Commission has also proposed four 
possible rationalisation scenarios: a) Maintaining the status quo, b) Maintaining the tenets of the 
Abuja  Treaty  within  a  shorter  time  frame,  c)  Rationalisation  by  anchored  community,  d) 
Rationalisation of a political decision by heads of state. See Report of the meeting of experts on 
the  rationalisation  of  Regional  Economic  Communities  (RECs)  held  in  Ouagadougou,  Burkina 
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4.4  Skewed distribution of benefits and hegemonic threats 
 
One of the principal motivations behind a state’s participation in regional integration 
initiatives is the expectation of immediate and long-term welfare gains. In a situation 
where a country loses out on the benefits accruing from integration schemes, there 
is  a  strong  possibility  of  such  a  country  either  committing  half-heartedly  to 
integration objectives or completely pulling out.
132 As Molle points out, two reasons 
underlie the need for redistribution policies in a regional integration scheme.  The 
first is the "efficiency argument," which holds that the uneven distribution of benefits 
such  as production factors and economic activities prevents the economy from 
reaping full profits and attaining maximum potential.
133 The second is the  "equity 
argument,"  which  states  that  inequality  is  socially  unacceptable  and  morally 
unfair.
134 
 
The  position  with  regional  integration  in  Africa  is  that  the  countries  with  the 
strongest economies end up deriving maximum advantage, to the detriment of other 
member states. For example, in the old EAC Kenya, due to its relatively developed 
economy, benefited more than the other partner states. Various measures were put 
in place to address this imbalance. The transfer tax system was adopted to ensure 
that industries in Uganda and Tanzania operated efficiently through the provision of 
additional  budgetary  revenues.
135  A  related  measure  was  the  East  Africa 
Development  Bank’s  (EADB)  decision  to  increase  its  investment  in  the  less 
industrialised states.
136 Due to its limited resources, the EADB could not achieve a 
significant result in this regard.
137 Another criticism levelled against the bank was 
that it invested in  projects which had little effect on the stre ngthening of the 
economies of member states. One of the measures  taken in an attempt to ensure 
redistribution was the relocation of the headquarters of common services and  the 
                                                           
132   Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series 7-8. 
133   Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series 8. 
134   Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series) 9. 
135   Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 153. 
136   The Bank’s development activity was unevenly distributed in order to benefit the less developed 
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decentralisation of the operations. The lack of clarity with regard to the objective of 
decentralisation brought about a position in which there were two centres of power: 
the Community on the one hand, and the country headquarters on the other.
138 
 
These measures, in spite of their well-intentioned aims, were insufficient to redress 
imbalances which had their roots in the colonial administrative configuration. The 
low level of development of member states accentuated even the slightest trace of 
inequality.  This  situation  exacerbated  the  rivalry  in  the  Community  and  thus 
contributed to the dissolution of the Community.  
 
As noted earlier, the transformatio n of  the  SACU from an organisation  "cast in 
imperialist mould"
139 into an institution of equals led to the review of the revenue -
sharing formula. Alden  and Soko observe that South Africa,  due to its developed 
infrastructure and currency, remains the dominant partner in the  SACU relationship 
In spite of the generous and favourable revenue -sharing formula.
140 The fact that 
the  South  African  rand  remains  the  legal  tender  within  the  zone,  except  for 
Botswana, means that member states cannot exercise independent fiscal and macro-
economic policies without South Africa’s consent.
141 
 
In a situation where regional hegemons solely dictate and determine the pace of 
integration,  there  is  bound  to  be  the  decimation  of  the  influence  of  regional 
organisations. In such a scenario regional organisations become the mouth-piece of 
regional powers and thus lose legitimacy and the support of smaller member states. 
This situation is pointedly explained as follows: 
 
[T]he more obvious the existence of a regional hegemon, the more vigorous the 
rejection amongst smaller states. The independence of this variable in relation to 
“national identities” is based on the fact that asymmetry can be perceived as a 
hazard  without  this  being  based  on  national  sentiments:  citizens  can  shirk 
supranational projects involving a much larger entity due to fears that the lack of 
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influence of their own country within the arrangements will harm local interests, 
regardless of their attitudes towards the concept of nationhood.
142 
 
While  the  influence  of  regional  hegemons  in  any  integration  process  cannot  be 
completely wished away, the point being made is that it is essential that mechanisms 
which allow the indispensability of smaller member states in the decision-making 
process are put in place. 
 
4.5  Political instability 
 
It  is  trite  knowledge  that  the  implementation  of  integration  objectives  demands 
some level of political stability in member states. Supranational organisations can 
(effectively) assert their control and influence only in a stable climate. The fact that 
integration programmes require domestic and uniform implementation, for example, 
lends credence to this assertion. The instability in most African countries as a result 
of  election  rigging,  the  intimidation  of  the  opposition  and  of  the  citizenry  clearly 
frustrates the attainment of the uniformity of standards and objectives. From Gabon 
to  Ethiopia,  Zimbabwe  to  Cameroon,  Equatorial  Guinea  to  the  Gambia,  African 
leaders continue to make a mockery of the core principles of good governance and 
democracy.  This  has  in  turn  spurred  a  litany  of  perennial  conflicts  plaguing  the 
continent.
143  
 
The negative impact of armed conflicts on the continent’s economy cannot be over-
emphasised.
144 According to the IMF, the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, the largest country 
in the WAEMU zone, impacted negatively on the economic situation of the whole 
zone.
145  Conflicts undermine the integration process by creating distrust among 
member states and more importantly the  diversion of funds that could have been 
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143   See eg Cilliers 2005 http://bit.ly/14nsKqk. 
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used  to  promote  and  sustain  integration  initiatives.
146  Such commitments should 
include the devolution of monitoring and disciplinary powers to regional institutions.  
With such powers, regional institutions would be a ble to promptly intervene in 
(potential) conflict situations and also impose relevant sanctions on errant member 
states. 
 
4.6  Democratic deficit 
 
The centrality of democracy to the integration process cannot be understated. As 
previously highlighted, integration requires the uniform application of standards and 
objectives. In this regard, member states are expected to embrace and practise the 
principles  of  good  governance  and  democracy.  The  need  for  adherence  to 
democratic  values  is  even  more  pertinent  considering  the  fact  that  the  onus  of 
enforcing decisions is placed on member states. If integration is understood as a 
process which not only promotes the establishment of common institutions but also 
the  upliftment  of  individuals,  then  it  is  crucial  that  these  individuals  are  able  to 
exercise their democratic rights. As Habib et al point out: 
 
These norms are critical to further deepen integration… Africa will unite faster if 
Africans embark on democratisation drives and create democratic institutions based 
on  the  logic  of  the  self-empowerment  of  the  people  on  the  foundation  of  an 
effective and engaged state civil society nexus.
147 
 
The problem with the integration process in Africa is that the people are excluded 
from matters relating to integration. Decisions and policies emanating from regional 
integration are neither subjected to referendums nor to broad consultation with the 
people  concerned.  The  consequence  is  that  the  people  know  little  about  the 
integration  process  and  thus  attach  little  or  no  significance  to  the  regional 
institutions. It thus begs the question: If some African leaders are not prepared to 
                                                           
146   It is also estimated that about 24 African countries have spent around USD300bn on conflicts 
since 1990. See Oxfam, IANSA and Saferworld 2007 http://bit.ly/ZlTq6j 3. 
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allow  democratisation  at  the  national  sphere,  what  is  the  probability  of  their 
encouraging it at a transnational or regional level?  
 
Even when integration is exclusively based on business and monetary matters (e.g. 
OHADA, WAEMU and CEMAC), the idea of democracy and good governance cannot 
be  totally  removed  from  it.  While  some  may  argue  that  matters  like  these  have 
nothing to do with human rights, the reality is that the absence of the rule of law in 
member  states  may  also  have  negative  effects  on  the  willingness  of  potential 
investors.  
 
As  long  as  the  commitment  to  democratic  values  remains  within  the  realm  of 
rhetoric, integration initiatives will continue to flounder, unable to attain their full 
potential. Therefore, it is essential that regional institutions are bequeathed with the 
necessary  powers  to  monitor  compliance  with  democratic  standards  in  member 
states. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This article provides an analysis of supranational experiments within Africa. It further 
offers an insight into the organisational framework of such experiments. Like other 
regional integration schemes, African integration has had its fair share of problems. 
Africa has never been in short supply of integration initiatives. The problem with 
them, however, lies mainly in the lack of sufficient political will in member states to 
translate their idealistic statements into concrete action.  
 
Political  will,  beyond  the  oft-cited  problem  of  the  weak  economic  structures  of 
African states, plays a major role in the success of any integration process. As is 
evident from the relative success of the OHADA, the granting of the requisite powers 
to regional organisations is fundamental. It is not suggested that political will is the 
only requirement for a successful regional integration process, but it certainly helps 
firm up the foundation on which virile cooperation may be built. 
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The success of supranationalism on the continent could be enhanced by learning 
from the experiences of organisations that  have attempted to establish leviathan 
institutions.  As  shown  in  this  article,  the  problems  experienced  by  these 
organisations  are  similar.  It  is  simplistic  to  assume  that  addressing  the  factors 
discussed above will guarantee the effective operation of supranationalism in Africa. 
Nevertheless,  working  towards  understanding  these  obstacles  and  gradually 
correcting them would be a necessary first step. B FAGBAYIBO    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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